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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

GREGORY J. MARSHALL,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890121-CA

Category No. 10

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
defendant's motion to suppress evidence entered on March 6, 1989
in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County,
State of Utah.

On April 4, 1989, this Court granted defendant's

petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Is the trial court's factual finding that a valid

safety reason existed for the stop of defendant's vehicle clearly
erroneous?
2.

Is the trial court's factual finding that defendant

could be briefly detained for identification of the driver,
registration of the vehicle and issuance of a warning citation
clearly erroneous?

3.

Is the trial court's factual finding that the

defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle
clearly erroneous?
4.

Did the trial court err in reaching the legal

conclusion that the stop and subsequent search of defendant's
vehicle were constitutionally valid?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and constitutional provisions
for a determination of this case are:
1. Amendment IV, United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized,
2.

Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982):

Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect - Grounds. A peace officer
may stop any person in a public place when he
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.

_«*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with
Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit, 145 pounds of
marijuana, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8 (Supp. 1989) (R. 2). In a pretrial motion, defendant
moved to suppress the marijuana (R. 23-4).

An evidentiary

hearing was held before the Honorable Donald V. Tibbs, Judge,
Sixth Judicial District, State of Utah (R.39).

Subsequent to the

hearing, both parties submitted memorandum to the trial court (R.
56-87, 32-37, 41-8).

On February 15, 1989, defendant's motion to

suppress the evidence seized was denied (R. 54-5, Findings and
Order Denying Motion to Suppress).

Defendant then sought and was

granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal (R. 91, 187).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 25, 1988, at approximately 9:15 a.m., Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery was on routine patrol on S.R.
70 near Salina, Sevier County, Utah (T-l. 4; T-2. 3, 5).

As

Trooper Avery was turning over the median to continue his patrol,

The following statement of facts relies on the transcript of
defendant's preliminary hearing held on July 19, 1988 in this
matter (R. 16-18) and incorporated by reference in defendant's
motion to suppress in the lower court (R.56); the transcript of
the deposition of Trooper Denis Avery held on October 14, 1988 in
connection with forfeiture proceedings in this matter and
incorporated and published in defendant's motion to suppress in
the lower court (R. 56; T.46-7); and, the transcript of the
evidentiary hearing in the trial court on defendant's motion to
suppress (T-l). Consistent with the indexing on appeal, the
preliminary hearing transcript will be referred to as (T-2. page
number), the deposition transcript as (D-l. page number) and the
suppression hearing transcript as (T-l. page number). Further,
since the testimony in all three hearings was substantially
consistent, reference will only be made to the testimony during
the motion to suppress (T-l) except as otherwise appropriate.
-3-

he noticed defendant's vehicle in the left hand lane passing a
motor home (T-l. 4# 8; T-2. 7-8). Defendant's vehicle was not
speeding nor passing improperly and the trooper did not pursue
the vehicle (T-2. 7). However, after the trooper completed his
turn and proceeded behind the vehicle/ the trooper could observe
that the turn signal of defendant's vehicle had remained blinking
(T-2. 8) For approximately two more miles defendant failed to
cancel his signal light (T-2. 9). Not knowing whether there was
a mechanical problem or whether defendant had negligently left
the turn signal on, the trooper pulled the vehicle over to inform
defendant of the problem and issue a warning ticket (T-l. 8, 9;
D-l. 15, 20). Trooper Avery had followed this same procedure in
observing other vehicles having a continuous turn signal (D-l.
16; T-2. 13).
Prior to stopping defendant, Trooper Avery had noticed
that the vehicle had California license plates (T-l. 10). He did
not see how many individuals were in the vehicle nor did he
notice anything about any particular individual (D-l. 23, 24).
He had no opinion about the race of any occupant of the vehicle
prior to the stop; and, is not of the belief that the race of a
defendant is relevant to any determination of involvement in
criminal activity (D-l. 23, 31). In fact, defendant in this case
is a fair skinned Caucasian (D-l. 22). The trooper did not call
his dispatcher to tell her that he was pulling the car over nor
did he request any backup assistance (D-l. 17). He did not
because his only intention in stopping defendant was to inform
defendant of the equipment problem and issue a warning citation
(T-l. 8, 19; D-l. 15,20).
-4-

Consistent with this purpose, Trooper Avery approached
defendant while defendant was in his vehicle (T-l. 12). When the
trooper informed defendant of the signal light problem, defendant
responded that he had been having "a hard time keeping that thing
turned off" (T-l. 12; D-l. 17). The trooper asked defendant to
identify himself and provide his driver's license and vehicle
registration (T-2. 12). Defendant supplied the trooper with a
New York license and a California rental agreement for the
vehicle (T-2. 12; D-l. Deposition Exhibit 1, Incident Report).
Defendant stated that he was going to Colorado to ski and would
be returning the vehicle to San Diego, California (T-l. 15).
This was inconsistent with the rental contract which indicated
that the car was to be returned to New York within four days (T1. 15).
Defendant and Trooper Avery went to the trooper's car
so that the trooper could issue the warning citation for the turn
signal (T-l. 17). After issuing the citation, the trooper
returned to defendant his driver's license, rental agreement and
the warning citation (T-l. 21).
The trooper asked defendant if he could look inside the
vehicle (T-l. 5, 22; T-2. 18). Defendant responded "Go ahead"
(T-l. 5, 22; T-2. 18). Trooper Avery and defendant walked back
to defendant's vehicle.

The passenger door was locked but

defendant reached in on the driver's side and opened the door (T1. 24-5).

A small red bag was on the floor of the vehicle.

Trooper Avery asked if he could open it and defendant agreed (T1. 25). No contraband was found in the interior of the car (T-l.

-5-

25-6).

Trooper Avery then asked if defendant had the key to the

trunk and if defendant would open the trunk (T-l. 27;D-1. 55).
Defendant got the key and began opening the trunk.

At this

point, defendant started shaking so badly that the trooper had to
hold up the latch cover so defendant could insert the key (T-l.
31; T-2. 20). Trooper Avery's practice is to always have the
driver open the trunk, MJust so that, you know, if he has any
objections, he's right there.
the keys himself.

I don't have the keys.

He's free to go —

He's got

there's no coercion factor"

(T-2. 56).
Upon opening the trunk, four padlocked suitcases were
visible.

The trooper asked defendant what was in the cases,

defendant responded "clothes" (T-l. 28). Trooper Avery asked if
he could look inside the bags and defendant immediately responded
that the suitcases were not his and must have already been in the
vehicle when he rented it (T-l. 28; D-l. 57). After unzipping
one bag a few inches and determining that it contained marijuana,
the trooper seized the suitcases and arrested defendant for
felony possession of marijuana (T-l. 28, 30).
Defendant did not testify nor present any evidence in
contradiction of the trooper's testimony in the court below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A defendant has the burden of establishing ownership in
any property seized for purposes of standing to challenge a
search and seizure.

Here, defendant abandoned any claim of

ownership in the property at the time of his arrest and further
failed to assert any interest in the property in the court below.

-6-

As such, this Court should sua sponte determine that defendant
lacks standing.
Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's
challenge, review must be limited to a determination of whether
the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous and
whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusions based on
those factual findings.

Here, the evidence as a whole amply

supports the trial court's factual findings that defendant's
vehicle was validly stopped and that defendant voluntarily
consented to a search of the interior and trunk areas of the
vehicle.

Further, the trial court properly applied appropriate

law in concluding no constitutional rights of defendant's were
violated such that the evidence should be suppressed.
Even if this Court assumed for purposes of analysis
that the stop of the vehicle is invalid as pretextual,
defendant's voluntary consent to the search purges the seizure
from any taint of illegality.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
SEIZURE OF THE FOUR SUITCASES.
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress the four suitcases containing marijuana seized
from the trunk of the vehicle rented by defendant.

However,

based on defendant's consistent denial of ownership of the
suitcases, defendant lacks standing to challenge the seizure.
Respondent acknowledges that at the time of the search
defendant had a possessory interest in the vehicle pursuant to
-7-

the valid rental agreement; and, thus, standing to object
generally to the search of the vehicle.

The limited issue for

purposes of this case is not standing to object to the place of
the search but standing to object as to the property seized.
Here, defendant has disclaimed any possessory interest or
ownership of the suitcases both during the search and subsequent
to his arrest.

Of equal importance, defendant did not testify

nor otherwise assert a possessory interest in the suitcases
during the hearings below.

In fact, defendant's position has

consistently been the suitcases were left in the vehicle by
another renter; he has claimed no knowledge of their existence in
the trunk nor of their contents (T-l. 28; T-2. 20; D-l. 57 and
Deposition Exhibit 1, Incident Report).

Under such

circumstances, defendant should be viewed as having abandoned any
privacy interest through his disclaimer of ownership.

United

States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1981), modified on other
grounds, 674 F.2d 1217, cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); United
States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
Williams, 538 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1976).
In Utah, the federal standard governing standing as
found in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh. denied, 423
U.S. 1122 (1979), has been adopted.
1334 (Utah 1984).

State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d

A defendant only has standing to object to a

search or seizure of evidence when he can establish that he had
"a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place," Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143.

Constitutional prohibitions

against unlawful search and seizure are personal and do not

-8-

extent to the search of another's premises or property.
133.

Id. at

While a defendant "who owns or lawfully possesses or

controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate
expectation of privacy" in the property; Jd. at 144, n.12; a
defendant who asserts neither a property nor a possessory
interest in the property seized has no legitimate expectation of
privacy and therefore lacks standing.

Id. at 148. Further,

"[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated
by the challenged search or seizure," Ld. at 131, n.l.
Consistentlyf the Utah Appellant Courts have
interpreted Rakas as denying standing where the defendant claimed
no ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle searched nor
the property seized.

State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334; State v.

Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d
194 (Utah App. 1987).

While these cases considered both the lack

of interest in the place searched as well as the property seized,
the Utah Supreme Court has found it equally "specious" for a
defendant to disclaim any interest in an item seized and yet
later attack the seizure as a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights.

State v. Meyers, 21 Utah 2d 110, 441 P.2d

510, 511 (1968).
Other jurisdictions have applied the same reasoning in
determining that a criminal defendant can have no standing to
object to the search or seizure of property the defendant has
voluntarily abandoned.

See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,

240-41 (1960) reh'q. denied, 363 U.S. 984 (1960); State v.

-0-

Mahone, 67 Haw. 644, 701 P.2d 171, 175 (1985); Menefee v. State,
640 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Okl. Cr. 1982); and State v. Salit, 613 P.2d
245, 255-56 (Alaska 1980).

There can be no privacy interest to

protect in abandoned property.

State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853,

857 (Utah 1978).
In determining if property has been abandoned, the
question is one of intent.

Did defendant through words, acts or

other objective facts evidence an intent to abandon any interest
in the property?

State v. Mahone, 701 P.2d at 175. A verbal

disclaimer of ownership can constitute an abandonment of fourth
amendment protections.

United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199

(9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); United States
v. Miller 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S.
958 (1979); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.
1973).
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that
defendant initially denied ownership of the suitcases at the time
of their discovery.

As the trooper testified:

Subsequently, when I opened the trunk I asked
him what was in the bag. He told me clothes.
Immediately he reversed his thing and told me
it must have been in the trunk when he rented
the vehicle.
(T-l. 28). Defendant expanded upon his disclaimer after his
arrest while being transported to the jail when he told the
trooper:
[Defendant] was standing in line at the
rental agency and they had checked his credit
and credit cards and they told him that even
if he paid cash, they wouldn't rent him a
vehicle. A man standing behind [defendant]
spoke up and said that he would rent the
-10-

vehicle for [him] if [defendant] would pay
for it.
(D-l. Deposition Exhibit 1, Incident Report, Paragraph 26).
This is not a situation such as in State v. Holmes, 774
P.2d 506, 511, n.5 (Utah App. 1989) where this Court determined
that a single disclaimer of ownership asserted at the scene in
response to police questioning was insufficient to deny defendant
standing.

Rather, here defendant has consistently asserted a

temporary possessory interest in the rented vehicle while
preserving his argument that others had access to the vehicle
prior to his possession such that the contraband must be theirs
and not his.

He is attempting to turn his transitory interest in

the place searched into a defense to the crime charged; yet, at
the same time, argue he has a constitutional interest in the
property seized.

It is this inconsistent bootstrapping which the

United States and Utah Supreme Courts rejected in adopting the
expectation of privacy test of Rakas v. Illinois over the
automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960), overruled, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
Have failed in the lower court to establish any "claimed right of
possession" in the four suitcases, defendant lacks standing to
object their seizure.

State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d at 127.

Finally, respondent acknowledges the Utah Supreme
Court's recent conclusion that "standing to challenge the
validity of a search under the Fourth Amendment is not
jurisdictional" and therefore may be waived if only raised for
the first time on appeal.
38, 41 (Utah 1989).

State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep.

However, as noted by Justice Howe with the

concurrence of Chief Justice Hall, the Utah Appellate Courts have
consistently recognized that "[s]tanding is an issue that a court
can raise sua sponte at any time", IdL , at 43, J. Howe,
dissenting.
(1989).

In accord, State v. Tuttle, 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8

Under the facts of this case where defendant's failure

to establish any possessory interest in the property seized is
obvious from the record, respondent would urge this Court to
consider sua sponte the issue of standing to avoid plain error.
State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 39 (1989); State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).
POINT II
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS.
Defendant argues through out his appellate brief that
this Court should construe both state constitutional protections
and state statutory procedures as offering greater protection to
a criminal defendant than those protections afforded by the
fourth amendment of the federal constitution.

The Utah Supreme

Court has noted:
Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the
fourth amendment, and thus this Court has
never drawn any distinctions between the
protections afforded by the respective
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court
has always considered the protections
afforded to be one and the same.
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) (citations
omitted).

In accord, State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 n.2

(Utah App. 1989).

-12-

Additionally, this Court has ruled that "nominally
alluding" to any asserted differences in federal and state
constitutional guarantees in the trial court does not
sufficiently raise the issue for purposes of appellate review.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. Rather, "motions to suppress
should be supported by precise averments, not conclusionary
allegations," Id.

at 328. Thus, an appellate court will not

consider particular grounds for suppressing evidence unless those
same grounds were argued at the lower court level.

Id.

Here, defendant did not argue for any separate state
analysis at the trial court level.

In oral argument at the

suppression hearing, reference was only made to federal
constitutional standards (T-l. 32-36).

Similarly, in his

memorandums submitted to the trial court, defendant only
nominally alluded to state constitutional provisions without
analysis (R.56-87, 41-48).

Therefore, defendant's present

argument for a stricter state standard should not be considered
by this Court.

Points 1(B), 11(C) and III(A) of Appellant's

brief should be disregarded.

All constitutional applications

should be limited to federal constitutional standards.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS VALIDLY STOPPED.
Defendant makes a wide ranging attack on the trial
court's factual determination that the vehicle driven by
defendant was properly stopped "based on the Officer's perceived
vehicle safety problems of a broken turn signal or driver's
negligenceM (R.54, Finding 1 of Order Denying Motion to
-n-

Suppress).

However, defendant's argument is basically twofold:

first, that an officer may only stop a vehicle for traffic
violations as opposed to observed unsafe vehicle conditions; and,
second, that the officer in this case only stopped defendant's
vehicle as a pretext to a search.

Neither argument is supported

by the factual findings of the lower court nor the legal
conclusions of the appellate courts.
Basic to the fallacy of defendant's arguments is
defendant's disregard for the applicable standard in reviewing
trial court rulings on motions to suppress. As stated by this
Court:
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). State v. Johnson,
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989).

Further,

The trial court's finding is clearly
erroneous only if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence or if [the appellate
court] reach[s] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.
State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah App. 1988).
This Court must sustain the trial court's factual
findings unless those findings are against the clear weight of
the evidence or otherwise clearly erroneous; but, may, as
appropriate, review for error the lower court's legal conclusions
based on the factual findings.

State v> Johnson, 771 P.2d at

327.
As previously noted, the trial court factually
concluded the stop of defendant's vehicle was constitutionally
.1 A -

valid as "based on the Officer's perceived vehicle safety
problems of a broken turn signal or driver's negligence" (R.54,
Finding 1 of Order Denying motion to Suppress).

This

determination was supported by the following facts:
1.

While on routine patrol, Trooper Avery observed

defendant's vehicle pass a motorhome on the highway (T-l. 4).
2.

While continuing on routine patrol, Trooper Avery

observed the turn signal on defendant's vehicle fail to turn off
and to continue blinking (T-2. 8).
3.

The turn signal remained on for two more miles (T-

4.

The trooper decided to pull defendant's vehicle

2. 9).

over because of the suspected mechanical failure of the signal to
turn off (T-l. 8, 9).
5.

In pulling the defendant over, the trooper decided

to inform the driver of the problem and issue a warning citation
(T-l. 8, 9).
6.

After the defendant stopped his vehicle, the

trooper approached defendant as the driver of the vehicle and
informed him of the turn signal problem.

Defendant acknowledged

the equipment failure by stating that he had been having problems
with the signal turning off (T-l. 12).
7.

The trooper issued a warning notice to defendant

marking the violation as for Mlights, head, tail or other" (D-l.
13; Deposition Exhibit 2# Warning Notice).
8.

The trooper has previously stopped vehicles for

similar problems with signal lights and given warning notices (D1. 16; T-2. 13).

Despite these facts, defendant speciously argues that
the trooper was mistaken in believing that a failed turn signal
is a traffic violation and therefore the trooper had no right to
stop defendant's vehicle (Br. of Appellant, at 14). Defendant
cites to various provisions of Title 41, the traffic code, and
the Rules and Regulations and Instructions for Official Vehicle
Inspection Stations to contend that a vehicle traveling on the
highways of Utah need not be affixed with properly working turn
signals.

Such is not the case. As seen by defendant's own

citations, Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-121.10 (1988) requires all
vehicles manufactured after 1953 to be equipped with electric
turn signals.

Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-117 (1988) requires all

vehicles on the highway to have "lamps or other equipment in
proper condition or adjustment."

Further, if a car is being

inspected and a signal light fails to automatically cancel the
driver is to be advised.

Section V, Rules and Regulations and

Instructions for Official Vehicle Inspection Stations.

The

evidence did establish that defendant was driving a 1988 Plymouth
four-door on S.R.70 in Sevier County, Utah (D-l. Deposition
Exhibit 2, Warning Notice) as such the trial court was fully
entitled to take judicial notice that defendant's vehicle was
required to be in working condition.
Further, defendant argues that unless the state proved
a specific traffic violation was involved, the trooper could not
stop defendant's vehicle.

In support, defendant cites State v.

Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988).

In doing so, defendant

mi8construe8 this Court'8 decision and disregards fundamental
caselaw governing stops of vehicles.
-16-

In Baird, the officer passed the defendant's vehicle
and without any supportable facts determined that "something just
truck me funny about it," 763 P.2d at 1215.

Based on this hunch,

the officer deliberately followed the defendant's vehicle and
stopped it to see if its safety sticker was valid.

After the

vehicle was stopped but before questioning defendant, the officer
was able to see that the sticker was valid.
officer continued to detain defendant.

Despite this, the

Relying on Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975), this Court restated and applied the accepted
standard that an officer must have reasonable, articulable
suspicions that a person has committed or is about to commit a
crime prior to stopping that person's vehicle and detaining the
individual.

State v. Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216.

This has been the

universal standard for state and federal courts and is codified
in Utah law in Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) which states:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
In Baird, as well as subsequent cases, this Court has
concluded that whenever the police stop an automobile, the stop
"necessarily involves detention and therefore is [an] encounter
requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion," State v. Holmes,
774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989), quoting State v, Baird, 763
P.2d 1214, 1216. While reasonableness must be based on
objectivety, there is no "bright line delineating what is or is
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not reasonable," Id.

at 508.

The fallacy of defendant's argument is that Delaware v.
Prouse does not stand for the proposition that an officer may
only stop a vehicle for observable traffic violations and not
observable safety problems.

Just the opposite.

The United

States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that an officer is
duty bound in the "vital interest of highway safety" to stop
vehicles for a variety of safety reasons which may or may not be
actual traffic code violations for:
Many violations of minimum vehicle safety
requirements are observable and something can
be done about them by the observing officer,
directly and immediately.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660-661. While rejecting random
stop checks, the Court concluded that an officer may stop a
vehicle for a "multitude of applicable traffic and equipment
regulations", if observed, and detain the person while
determining the driver's identification, vehicle registration and
a determination of the appropriateness of a citation.

Such stops

are justified in light of the State's interest in having only
qualified drivers and safely equipped vehicles on its road.

To

this end:
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to
pervasive and continuing governmental
Respondent concedes that the initial stop of defendant's
vehicle constituted a level two detention. State v. Johnson, 717
P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah
1987). Because defendant consented contemporaneously with the
termination of this detention, it is not critical to this case to
determine if a level two detention may subsequently revert to a
level one detention through the conduct of the officer; in other
words, would a level two detention terminate with the issuance of
a citaiton and return of a defendant's documents?

regulation and controls, including periodic
inspection and licensing requirements. As an
everyday occurrence, police stop and examine
vehicles when license plates or inspection
stickers have expired, or if other
violations, such as exhaust fumes or
excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights
or other safety equipment are not in proper
working order.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976), quoted with
approval in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
Once stopped, an officer may inquire as to information
about the driver and vehicle "reasonably related in scope to the
justification" for the detention, United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 881, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29
(1968).

Defendant notes correctly that the United States

Supreme Court has declined to establish a per se rule governing
the length of duration acceptable for an investigatory stop (Br.
of Appellant at 26). But, the Court has more than declined.

It

has ruled that to establish such a bright line would be
inappropriate as "common sense and ordinary human experience must
govern over rigid criteria," United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 685 (1984).

For,

While it is clear that "the brevity of the
invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests is an important factor in
determining whether the seizure is so
minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on
reasonable suspicion, . . . we have
emphasized the need to consider the law
enforcement purposes to be served by the stop
as well as the time reasonably needed to
effectuate those purposes.
Id. at 685.

Thus,the brief delay necessitated by the issuance of

a traffic citation is not only minimumally instructive, but
proper and inevitable.

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702
+ r\

(1983).

So too, is the usual police protective procedure of

removing the driver from the vehicle while issuing a citation.
3
Pennsylvannia v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
The trial court
was, therefore, justified in finding that the investigation was
reasonable in duration and scope based on the circumstances of
confronted by Trooper Avery (R. 54, Findings 2 and 3, Order
Denying Motion to Suppress).
The second prong of defendant's argument is that the
officer's stop of the vehicle was pretextual to his search and
therefore invalid.
1988).

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.

Defendant correctly argues that in determining when a

stop is pretextual this Court has adopted the objective standard
of whether a reasonable officer would have stopped defendant's
vehicle as opposed to the question of merely could the officer
stop the vehicle.

Id.

at 978, applying the reasoning of United

States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).

There must be an

"objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on
the officer's actual state of mind," State v. Sierra, at 977.
This assessment must be made in light of the totality of the
circumstances, l^d- i

ancl

^6

not

invalidated merely because the

officer's subjective motives may have been improper.

United

States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to allow
an officer, without consent, to open the trunk area of a stopped
vehicle with faulty brake lights as being incident to an on-site
vehicle inspection. United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313
(1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981).
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Here, the trial court rejected defendant's argument
that the stop was pretextual.

In making this factual assessment,

the lower court considered the general validity of the stop as
previously discussed and the additional facts that:
1.

The trooper was on routine patrol at the time of

observing defendant's vehicle and did not deviate from that route
to intentionally follow defendant (T-l. 3, 7).
2.

The trooper did not radio dispatch for additional

assistance in anticipation of a search or arrest prior to the
stop (D-1. 17).
3.

The only evidence presented in the lower court as

to the reason for the stop was the trooper's testimony in which
he said that his only criteria in stopping the vehicle was the
observable safety violation (T-l. 8, 9).
4.

In the six months prior to the stop of defendant,

the trooper had issued approximately five to ten warning
citations specifically for failure to turn off a turn signal.

In

none of those cases, did the trooper search the vehicles (D-1.
16; T-2. 13).
5.

For the sixty days prior to the stop of defendant

and for the thirty days after, the trooper had issued
approximately 175 traffic violations and an additional 175
warning citations.

In hypothetically, only one out of fifty of

those cases did the trooper search the stopped vehicles (D-1. 54,
62).
6.

Prior to stopping the vehicle, the trooper made no

determination as to the occupants of defendant's vehicle, neither

the number, sex, nor race, and did not consider these factors in
stopping the vehicle (D-l. 23-31).
7.

Prior to stopping the vehicle, the trooper was able

to observe that the vehicle had out-of-state license plates but
did not consider that information in stopping the vehicle (T-l.
10).
8.

In stopping a vehicle, the trooper "looks at each

car the same" (D-l. 29-30).
Other than counsel's assertion that the stop was
pretextual, defendant presented no evidence to contradict the
testimony of the trooper.
Based on the testimony, the trial court had ample
support for its factual finding that the stop was valid (R.54,
Finding 1, Order Denying Motion to Suppress).

Based on the law,

the trial court properly concluded, the "Officer had a right to
give a warning ticket and to obtain information on the driver and
ownership of the vehicle," (R. 54, Finding 2, Order Denying
Motion to Suppress).

Further, the scope of any inquiry was

reasonable (R.54; Finding 3, Order Denying Motion to Suppress).
There is no basis from which to conclude that the trial court's
rulings was clearly erroneous.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH
OF THE INTERIOR AND TRUNK AREA OF THE
VEHICLE.
As previously discussed, a trial court's factual
findings are entitled to due deference by this Court unless those
findings are found to be clearly erroneous in light of the entire
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record.

State v. Bruce, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1989).

This

standard has otherwise been stated as:
The appellate court . . . does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere
fact that on the same evidence the appellate
court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting the findings
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) quoting, Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2585 (1971).
Determinations as to consent are considered factual.

United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1979).
In determining whether a defendant's consent to a
search was voluntarily given, the Utah appellate courts adhere to
the "totality of circumstances" standard as set forth in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

In making this

evaluation, courts may consider the absence of any claim of
authority such as a search warrant by the officer, the absence of
any exhibition of force by the officer, if the defendant
responded to a request to search, the cooperation by the
defendant and the absence of deception or trick on the part of
the officer.
1980).

State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah

Other factors relating to the the age, intelligence and

education of the defendant may be considered.

Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218. While the court must look to all the
factual circumstances surrounding the giving of the consent, the
courts do not require nor advocate any set formula for obtaining
the consent.

Ici. In this regard, there is no legal requirement
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that the consent must be in written form to be valid nor that a
defendant be informed of his right to refuse consent.
227; State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106.

IdL at

However, the

burden of proving that the consent was voluntarily given is on
the State.

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); State

v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, May
15, 1989.
On facts almost identical to those at bar, the United
States Supreme Court determined in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that
the defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of both the
interior and trunk of his vehicle.

An officer on routine patrol

observed the defendant's vehicle with one headlight and the
license plate light burned out.

He stopped the vehicle and in

the course of the detention asked if he could search the vehicle.
The defendant said "Sure, go ahead".

After searching the

interior, the officer asked "Does the trunk open?".
defendant got the keys and opened the trunk.

The

Overturning the

lower court's suppression of the evidence, the Supreme Court
justified the consent as voluntary under the totality of the
circumstances.
Applying this same test to the present facts, the
record clearly indicates that defendant voluntarily consented to
the search of the vehicle he was driving (R. 54, Finding 4, Order
Denying Motion to Suppress).

As discussed in Point III,

defendant had been validly stopped on the highway because his
turn signal was continuing to blink.
problem when stopped.

Defendant acknowledged the

The trooper then asked defendant for his
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driver's license and vehicle registration.

Defendant gave the

trooper his license and the rental agreement for the vehicle.
Upon request, defendant accompanied the trooper to the trooper's
vehicle so that a warning ticket could be issued.

All of these

actions were as anyone would expect after being stopped for an
equipment problem, the existence of which is not questioned.
Prior to the citation being issued, the trooper and
defendant conversed (T-l. 16, 31). The conversation was not
unusual for such a situation. Defendant told the trooper that he
had rented the car to ski in Colorado and would be returning it
to California (T-l. 15). This statement did not coincide with
the information on the rental agreement which was that the car
was to be returned within four days to New York, the place of
defendant's residence (T-l. 15; D-l. Deposition Exhibit 2,
Warning Notice).

At the same time, the trooper observed that

defendant had certain characteristics and items in the car
consistent with a drug courier (T-l. 13-14; D-l. 22-36).

Based

on his training and experience, the trooper became suspicious.
Despite this, the trooper did not accuse defendant of any crime,
radio for additional officers or otherwise suggest to defendant
that the trooper suspected him of transporting narcotics.
Instead, the trooper gave back to defendant his driver's license,
rental agreement and warning citation (T-l. 21). While the
trooper did not affirmatively inform defendant he was free to go,
the act of returning the license, rental agreement and citation
would, under the circumstances, have put a reasonable person on
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notice that the detention had terminated.

This holds especially

true where, as here, the warning notice had plainly printed on
it:
This is not a summons to appear in Court. It
is a friendly contact by the highway patrol
regarding improper driving or the mechanical
condition of your vehicle. The highway
patrol requests your cooperation in
decreasing the number of motor vehicle
accidents on the highways of our state by
obeying all traffic regulations and
maintaining your vehicle in safe mechanical
condition.
(T-l. 17; D-l. Deposition Exhibit 2, Warning Notice).
Having concluded that he would ask for consent to
search the vehicle, Trooper Avery asked if defendant's vehicle
contained weapons, alcohol or drugs and then requested if he
could look inside the vehicle.

Defendant responded "Go ahead"

(T-l. 5, 22; T-2. 18).
The trooper and defendant proceeded to the vehicle, the
passenger door was locked and defendant, without further request,
reached in and unlocked the door (T-l. 24-25).

The trooper

searched the interior of the vehicle, located certain items but
not the contraband in question (T-l. 25-26).
Certainly, under the totality of the circumstances, the
evidence fully justifies the trial court's factual finding that
the defendant consented to the search.

Even counsel for

appellant conceded as much in the trial court by agreeing
Because "the scope of the fourth amendment protection does not
vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being
approached**, a reasonable person standard must be applied in
judging when a detained individual is free to go, Michigan v.
Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988). In accord, United States v.
Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1979).
-9A-

defendant consented to the search of the interior of the vehicle
(R.34-35).

Counsel's argument to the trial court was that when

defendant agreed to the search, he subjectively thought the
trooper would just do a plain view search of the interior and not
the trunk of the vehicle.

Based on defendant's position in the

lower court, he should be precluded on appeal from a claim that
the search of the interior of the car was not voluntarily
consented to by defendant.

State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 328.

The search of the trunk of defendant's vehicle occurred
subsequent to the search of the interior.

Immediately upon

completing the search of the interior, the trooper asked
defendant if he had the key to the trunk of the vehicle and if
the trooper could look inside it (T-l. 27; D-l. 55). Defendant
responded by getting the key and trying to open the trunk.
Defendant began shaking so violently as he attempted to open the
trunk that Trooper Avery had to hold the latch cover up while
defendant inserted the key (T-l. 31; T-2. 20). Upon opening the
trunk, the four suitcases were immediately visible (T-l. 28).
Trooper Avery allowed defendant to open the trunk as opposed to
handing the key to the trooper so that the trooper could be fully
aware if defendant had any objections (T-2. 56). Here, defendant
neither by word nor action ever protested the search of the
trunk.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, there is
ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that no
coercion or duress was placed on defendant to consent to the
search (R. 54, Finding 4, Order Denying Motion to Suppress).

When the trooper asked defendant if he would open the trunk,
defendant was not in custody nor otherwise unreasonably detained.
The trooper did not claim any authority to search nor deceive
defendant into thinking he had a warrant or right to search the
trunk.

In fact, just the opposite.

The trooper had just

finished searching the interior of the vehicle pursuant to
defendant's voluntary consent.
trooper had found a red bag.

While searching the inside, the

Despite the trooper's legal right

to search the bag, the trooper had asked defendant's permission
to do so.

Defendant had consented.

After this second request

and obtaining of consent, the trooper asked defendant if he had
the key and could look inside the trunk.

Clearly, during each

step of the search, the trooper asked and defendant agreed to
continue the search.

By asking permission in this manner, the

trooper clearly conveyed to defendant that his authority to
search did not extend to those areas of the vehicle to which
defendant did not consent.

The record is completely devoid of

any evidence of threatening or overbearing actions on the part of
the trooper as claimed by defendant in his brief.
Despite this evidence, defendant argues that the State
failed to establish the consent was voluntary because only
generalized questions were asked on direct examination, i.e., the
details of the stop and subsequent search were brought out in
cross-examination.

Defendant's point could have some validity if

after the direct examination of the trooper during the motion to
suppress, the State had rested and no further cross-examination
or other evidence had been presented.
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Instead, the State merely

asked the trooper relevant but generalized information on direct
and then turned the witness over for cross-examination.
Additionally, the transcript of the preliminary hearing as well
as the transcript of the trooper's deposition in the forfeiture
proceedings were incorporated and admitted for the court's
consideration.

Thus, this Court as well as the lower court is

not only entitled but mandated to look to the record as a whole
in determining the factual issues in question.
POINT V
EVEN IF THE STOP WAS DETERMINED TO BE
PRETEXTUAL, DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONSENT
PURGES THE TAINT OF ANY PRIOR ILLEGALITY.
Even if this Court were to simply assume for purposes
of analysis that the stop of defendant's vehicle was pretextual
or otherwise invalid, the seizure would still be permissible as
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the interior and
trunk of the vehicle.

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App.

1989), cert, granted, May 15, 1989; State v. Aguilar, 758 P.2d
457 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.
1988).

As stated by this Court, the appropriate inquiry is:
[WJhether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155. Noting that the United States
Supreme Court has rejected the Mbut for" type of analysis now
advocated by defendant, this Court continued:
Thus, even though this evidence would not
have been discovered "but for" the prior
illegal stop, the evidence is not per se
-29-

inadmissible. . . . Moreover, a search
conducted pursuant to voluntary consent
purges the taint from the prior illegality.
:id. at 155.
Defendant would have this Court focus away from the
objective voluntariness of defendant's consents to the subjective
motives of the trooper.

Defendant argues that a trooper must

have reasonable suspicion that a defendant is committing a crime
prior to seeking a consent to search.

Such an argument is

without factual or legal merit.
As discussed in Point III,

an officer must have

reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and question its
occupants. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. Where a officer observes a
traffic violation or safety problem, he may stop the vehicle.
Consistent with such a stop, the officer may issue a traffic or
warning citation.

A detention which occurs for this purpose is

justified by the initial purpose of the stop.

If during the

course of such a stop, the officer requests and the defendant
agrees to a search of the vehicle, there is no additional
requirement of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222.
Yet, defendant attempts to divert this Court by arguing
that if the officer has a hunch or relies on a drug courier
profile as his reason for seeking consent to search, that the
5
consent is somehow diminished.
The United States Supreme Court
Defendant confuses the insufficiency of objective facts with
their impermissibly. The courts have universally concluded that
all types of factors, including what might otherwise be
considered wholly innocent conduct, may be considered by an
officer. United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581. However,
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has recently responded to such a claim in determining if an
officer's basis for reasonable suspicion to detain a person is
invalid due to the officer's reliance on profile characteristics.
United States v. Sokolow# 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).

The Court

concluded that while reliance on a drug courier profile might
render an insufficient basis on which to stop and question an
individual, a profile is not a per se invalid basis for
establishing reasonable suspicion.

<Id.

at 1587. For,

A court sitting to determine the existence of
reasonable suspicion must require an agent to
articulate the factors leading to that
conclusion, but the fact that these factors
may be set forth in a "profile" does not
somehow detract from their evidentiary
significance as seen by a trained agent.
Id.

Specifically, the United States Supreme Court rejected the

very test which defendant claims this Court accepted in State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Defendant advocates a
reviewing court evaluate each factor relied on by the officer
individually, requiring each to individually establish a
reasonable suspicion rather than the totality of the factors (Br.
of Appellant, at 24.)

It was this same approach by the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d
1413 (9th Cir. 1987) cited by defendant which was rejected and
overruled.

The United States Supreme Court held that such a rule

in determining the reasonableness of a stop or detention would
"create unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the
relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment,"
Cont. those factors may in an individual case be insufficient.
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
972 (Utah App. 1988).

United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586.

Instead/ the Court

applied a "common sense" approach to look to all the factors,
innocent and otherwise, to determine if taken collectively they
established a reasonable basis for the detention.
Equally, unsupportable is defendant's argument that the
trooper was required to use the physically least instructive
methods in informing defendant of the mechanical problem such as
merely announcing over his loud speaker that the turn signal was
on (Br. of Appellant, at 19). Such gymnastics have again been
rejected by the United States Supreme Court as misapplying the
holding of Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
The Court in Florida v. Royer stated that "the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time," Iji. at 500.

In United

States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587, the Court clarified the
statement as referring to:
the length of the investigative stop, not at
whether the police had a less intrusive means
to verify their suspicions before stopping
Royer. The reasonableness of the officer's
decision to stop a suspect does not turn on
the availability of less intrusive
investigatory techniques.
Indeed, even the Court in Florida v. Royer noted that the
evidence would not have been suppressed if the consent had been
obtained at the point of detention as opposed to in a separate
police detention room to which the defendant had unreasonably
been removed.

Florida v. Royer at 505.
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Finally, defendant asks this Court to follow United
States v, Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985), in evaluating
this case.

Respondent concurs for Recalde, as do United States

v. Gonalaz, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985) and United States v.
Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986) cited by defendant, all turn
on the fact that the defendants had been significantly detained,
at times removed to a police station, while the defendant's
license and registration had not been returned.

Clearly, under

such facts, the State had to establish a reasonable basis for the
continued detention of the defendants; and, failing to do so, the
evidence was suppressed.

More recently, in United States v.

Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied 108 S. Ct.
2820 (1988), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
defendant's consent was valid despite the fact that the search of
the vehicle occurred at a police station while defendant was
clearly being detained.

Noting that United States v. Gonzalez

and United States v. Recalde were "limited to their facts", the
Court went on to evaluate the circumstances "as they appeared to
these prudent, cautious and trained police officers".
This Court need not make a separate determination as to
reasonableness beyond the initial detention.

If defendant was

validly stopped for a traffic problem, his limited initial
detention for purposes of identification, registration and the

See for comparsion, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
555, where defendant's personal identification and plane tickets
were returned to her prior to voluntarily consenting; and,
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, where consent would have been
voluntary if given prior to the unreasonable detention despite
the agents retaining the defendant's identification and tickets.
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issuance of a citation was reasonable.

If at the end of that

detention, with his license, rental agreement and citation
returned, defendant voluntarily consented to a search, there is
no additional issue of reasonableness to review.

Even if this

Court wishes for purposes of analysis to assume that the stop was
pretextual, there is still no basis of reasonableness to
determine as long as defendant voluntarily consented.

The fact

that the trooper may have compared defendant to profile
characteristics or had suspicions as to defendant's activities
prior to seeking consent is totally irrelevant to the validity of
the consent.

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153; State v. Aguilar,

758 P.2d 457; State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully
submits that the order of the trial court denying defendant's
motion to suppress should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

//y*h

day of September,

1989.

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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